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Abstract 
 
An increase in the likelihood of navigational collisions in port waters has put focus on the 
collision avoidance process in port traffic safety. The most widely used on-board collision 
avoidance system is the automatic radar plotting aid which is a passive warning system that 
triggers an alert based on the pilot’s pre-defined indicators of distance and time proximities at 
the closest point of approaches in encounters with nearby vessels. To better help pilot in 
decision making in close quarter situations, collision risk should be considered as a 
continuous monotonic function of the proximities and risk perception should be considered 
probabilistically. This paper derives an ordered probit regression model to study perceived 
collision risks. To illustrate the procedure, the risks perceived by Singapore port pilots were 
obtained to calibrate the regression model. The results demonstrate that a framework based on 
the probabilistic risk assessment model can be used to give a better understanding of collision 
risk and to define a more appropriate level of evasive actions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Navigational collisions are a major safety concern in many seaports. The growth of 
shipping traffic over the past decades has intensified collision likelihood in busy and 
congested port waters (Darbra and Casal, 2004; Sato and Ishii, 1998; Yip, 2007). 
Consequently, the collision avoidance process has come into focus in port navigation safety. 
In general, harbor pilots assess and mitigate collision risk by combining data obtained from 
collision avoidance systems (CAS) with information obtained by visual watch-keeping. The 
most widely CAS used on most merchant vessels is the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid 
(ARPA) (Statheros et al., 2008). It allows pilots to track a number of target vessels within the 
radar detection range. Apart from providing a graphical display of the surrounding vessel 
traffic, ARPA provides forecasted values of two proximity measures for selected target 
vessels – Distance at Closest Point of Approach (DCPA) and Time to Closest Point of 
Approach (TCPA). The two indicators are respectively the probable distance and time 
required between the subject vessel and a target vessel at their Closest Point of Approach 
(CPA), given that the course and speed of both vessels remain unchanged. Pilots make use of 
these proximity indicators as a basis of risk assessment to determine their own necessary 
course of action to avoid a collision. 
 
ARPA also possesses a warning system (e.g., aural alarm or flashing symbol) to alert the 
pilots of collision risk. Pilots may set some critical values (DCPAlimit and TCPAlimit) to trigger 
the warning system. Since the critical values are defined by pilots, ARPA is a passive system 
based on the intuitive perceived risks of the pilots. This warning system is useful to draw 
attention of pilots who needed reminder when they have temporarily lost situational 
awareness.  
 
Several researchers, such as Grech et al. (2002) and Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987) 
have shown that the lack of situational awareness is responsible for about 70% of human 
errors in navigation. Further, Hetherington et al. (2006) and Rothblum (2000) have also 
shown that human errors contribute to more than 90% of collisions. Employing this 
arrangement of alertness, risk of collision is expressed as a unit step function involving two 
possible states: ‘potential collision risk’ and ‘no risk’, the former state when both the 
proximity indicators are below the critical limits while the latter for any other condition.  
 
An improvement to the binary state of risk assessment is the three-level warning system 
proposed by Liu, Q. et al. (2006). Using preset critical values of DCPA and TCPA, they 
define the situation as “safe”, “potential collision risk” and “direct collision risk”. It should be 
noted that collision risk is strictly a continuous monotonic function of the proximity indicators 
based on the vessel interaction with influence from the performance capability and experience 
of the pilots in handling close quarter situations. Both the binary and three-state systems may 
not fully represent the range of risks involved and the appropriate actions needed of pilots. 
 
Other researches on CAS have focused on different aspects of collision avoidance, such as 
improvement on plotting performance of ARPA (Sato and Ishii, 1998; Pedersen et al., 1999), 
development of cone-shaped danger regions (Leanrt, 1983), evaluation of display techniques 
(Pedersen et al., 2002a), and evaluation of anti-collision maneuvers in CAS (Pedersen and 
Jacobsen, 2002; Pedersen et al., 2002b; Pedersen et al., 2003). In all cases collision risk is 
treated as a discrete variable rather than a continuous variable. Furthermore, as the 
performance and judgment in close encounter vary from one pilot to another, it is also 
necessary to consider the probabilistic aspects of defining risk. Moreover, other factors such 
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as vessel size and the environment play an important role in influencing navigational risk. 
These factors are not considered in the system of risk assessment and collision avoidance. 
 
This paper develops a probabilistic model of collision risk derived from perception of the 
pilots. Ordered Probit Regression modeling is employed to examine risk for navigation in 
different vessel classes under both day and night conditions. To illustrate the derivation of the 
model, perceived risks are obtained from a risk perception survey on Singapore port pilots.  
 
The following sections describe the methodology of the study consisting of the 
formulation, assessment and modeling considerations of the ordered probit regression model, 
followed by development of safety margins and description of a risk perception survey. 
Estimation results and model fitness are then discussed along with the interpretations of the 
perceived safety margins. A framework of probabilistic risk assessment in CAS is finally 
proposed. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Ordered Probit Regression Model 
 
To develop a probabilistic model of collision risk an ordered probit regression model is 
formulated, which is calibrated by using perceived risk data. Intensity of the risk can be 
expressed by a scale categorizing risk into five levels (see Table 1). The regression model is 
formulated to suit the categorical response variable. 
 
2.1.1 Model formulation 
Since the risk levels used in the scale are subjective but ordered in nature, an ordered 
categorical analysis will be most appropriate to treat such data. Two possible regression 
models may be employed: the ordered probit or ordered logit models. The models differ in the 
assumption of the distributions of regression errors. The probit model assumes a normal 
distribution of errors with mean 0 and variance 1, whereas the logit model assumes a standard 
logistic distribution with mean 0 and variance 32π . The ordered probit model is selected for 
this study though the choice matters little as both models produce very similar results. 
 
The ordered probit model is usually formulated as a latent (i.e., unobserved) variable 
framework. The structural model specification is: 
 
iiiy ε+=
∗ βX            (1) 
 
where ∗iy  is a continuous latent variable measuring perceived collision risk for the ith set of 
X ; iX is the vector of independent variables; β is the vector of regression coefficients; iε  is 
the random error term ( )1,0~ N . 
 
The measurement model, in which the latent variable ∗iy  is mapped on to an observed 
ordinal variable y , is specified as: 
 
mimi ymy ττ <≤=
∗
−1if ; for m = 1 to J       (2) 
 
 4 
where J is number of ordinal categories in y  and the threshold values (τ ) are unknown 
parameters describing the boundaries of risk levels. 
 
Therefore, the observed discrete risk levels are tied to the continuous latent variable as 
follows: 
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where the threshold values 1τ , 2τ , 3τ , and 4τ  are unknown parameters to be estimated. 
 
Based on the normality assumption of the error term, the probability of risk level m  for 
given iX  can be predicted as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )imimi FFmy XβXβX ˆˆˆˆrPˆ 1 −−−== −ττ  ; ( ) 1rPˆ
1
==∑
=
J
m
imy X     (4) 
 
where F is the cumulative distribution function forε . 
 
Once the probabilities of each risk level are predicted from the model estimates, 
associated collision risks can be computed. To do so, risk scores (RSm) are assigned to each 
risk level based on the thresholds, as shown in Figure 1. The RSm represents the probability of 
collision for risk level m. Using the proposed risk scale as shown in Table 1, risk scores for 
VHR and Safe levels are assigned values of 1 and 0 respectively. The VHR level refers to 
vessel interactions where collision cannot be avoided, which represents the probability of 
collision as 1. On the other hand where no action is required under the Safe level, the 
probability of collision is zero. As seen from equation (3), the Safe level exists if 4τ≥
∗y . The 
τ  values may be normalized to a probability value with the range [0,1]. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
The collision risk for given iX  can then be computed as: 
 
( )∑
=
=×=
J
m
imic myRSP
1
rPˆ XX ; 10 ≤≤ cP       (5) 
 
2.1.2 Model assessment 
In order to examine the significance of Xs included in model the z-test is employed and to 
evaluate if the model have sufficient explanatory and predictive power several goodness-of-fit 
(gof) measures found in Long and Freese (2006) are used. The likelihood ratio statistics, 
))0()((22 LLLLG −= β , is used to examine the overall gof of the model by testing the global 
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null hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are zero, where )(βLL  and )0(LL  are 
the log-likelihoods of the fitted model and the null model respectively. The McKelvey and 
Zavoina’s R2, ))()(/()(R Z&M 2 εVaryVaryVar += ∗∗ , is also used to measure the predictive 
power of the model. 
 
2.1.3 Modeling considerations 
The risk of collision in any vessel interaction may vary with the size of vessels involved. 
Perez and Clemente (2007) have shown that maneuverability and ease in speed adjustments 
diminishes as vessel size increases and for this reason, vessels of different sizes would 
produce different levels of risk in an interaction. Consequently, the perceived risks by the 
pilots may also vary. In order to consider the effects of vessel sizes in the study of perceived 
risks, vessels may be clustered into four vessel classes (VC) according to the vessel gross 
tonnage (GT). The classification based on the Singapore port regulations is used in this study 
(see Table 2).  
 
(Insert TABLE 2 here) 
 
As the perceived risk is influenced by the pilot’s experience in a particular vessel class, 
both experience and VC need to be considered together in the perception survey. In general, 
pilots with more experience are authorized to operate VC with higher GT, a positive 
association between experience and VC will exist. Hence, modeling perceived risks separately 
for each VC is necessary.  
 
Furthermore, navigation is affected by the environment, and in particular, in day and night 
settings. Therefore, perceived risks would also be different for day and night conditions. 
Hence, perceived risks need to be modeled separately for day and night conditions. 
 
2.2 Development of safety margins 
 
The ordered probit model distinguishes different risk levels by generating a set of 
thresholds, which represent the boundaries of the risk levels on the latent variable scale, as 
shown in equation (3). Since the values of τ  are on the scale of ∗y , the structural model 
(equation 1) can be modified as: 
 
TCPADCPAm ×+×= 21 ˆˆˆ ββτ ; for m = 1 to J-1      (6) 
 
where mτˆ , 1βˆ  and 2βˆ  are known parameters from regression estimates. Therefore, for each 
risk level two boundary points on DCPA and TCPA scale, i.e., )( 0=TCPADCPA  and 
)( 0=DCPATCPA  respectively, can be obtained by setting 0 TCPA =  and 0 DCPA =   
respectively in equation (6). 0=TCPADCPA  is the ‘distance safety margin’ (DSM) that pilots 
accept for the respective risk levels. For a given risk level, this would be the maximum 
passing distance between two ships that the pilots would allow. 0=DCPATCPA  is the ‘time 
safety margin’ (TSM) which represents the marginal time remaining before a collision. 
 
To examine the adequacy of the perceived safety margins in navigation, the margins can 
be compared against some existing standards. The margins are examined at two levels in a 
collision process; firstly, at the level requiring immediate evasive actions to prevent a 
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collision and secondly, at ship domain level where pilots start to perceive that a collision risk 
exists. The standards used for comparison are those related to ship maneuverability (IMO, 
2002) and ship domain (Fujii and Tanaka, 1971). 
 
2.2.1 Safety margins at immediate evasive action level 
The margins are compared against the IMO standards for ship maneuverability (IMO, 
2002). The standards are used to evaluate maneuvering performance of ships in design, 
construction, repair and operation of vessels. According to the standards, a vessel’s initial 
turning ability (ITA) is measured by a  10/10 zigzag test. The execution of the test includes 
application of a 10  rudder angle to an initially straight approach, which is termed as ‘first 
execute’. When the heading changes to 10  off the original heading, another 10  rudder angle 
is applied in the direction opposite to previous rudder angle application, which is termed as 
‘second execute’ (SE). The standard of ITA is that a vessel should not travel more than 2.5 
times of her length by the time of SE application from the original heading. 
 
The ITA standard can be employed to examine if the perceived safety margins at HR level 
are adequate enough for safe navigation. As seen from Table 1, the HR level refers to vessel 
interactions where immediate actions are necessary to avoid a potential collision. It means that 
if any actions are not taken immediately (i.e., TCPA = 0) the risk level will rise to the VHR 
level, which refers to interactions resulting in certain collision. Safety margins higher than the 
ITA standard imply that a pilot is “ahead of the vessel” (Bowditch, 1976), i.e., there is a 
sufficient safety margin to avoid a collision. 
 
Since the ITA standard includes the term, ship length, in its consideration, it is necessary 
to obtain representative lengths of all VCs. From observations of the vessels’ GT and length-
overall (LOA), the summary statistics of the LOAs of the VCs are presented in Table 3. The 
50th percentiles are used as representatives of the LOAs of VCs, because in the survey the 
pilots were asked to rate their perceived collision risk for an average vessel size that they 
operate frequently. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Although the ITA standard sets a requirement of maneuverability in terms of space, it does 
not set any direct requirement in terms of time. Therefore, a surrogate measure of 
maneuverability in terms of time requirement is derived. This is computed based on the 
limiting distance separation when the vessel is operating at the maximum regulated speed In 
this study, the maximum speed of navigation adopted is 12 knots according to the Singapore 
port regulations (MPA, 2006). This results in the surrogate measure, ‘time to second execute’ 
(TSE), which is the time to reach the SE in a  10/10 zigzag test at a speed of 12 knots. 
 
2.2.2 Safety margins at ship domain level 
The perceived safety margins at LR level can be compared against the standard of ship 
domain (Fujii and Tanaka, 1971) in order to examine the adequacy of the margins. The ship 
domain is the surrounding effective waters around a vessel that a pilot requires to keep clear 
of other vessels. According to this standard, a pilot is required to maintain a distance of at 
least 4 times the ship length, from the center of his vessel to that of other vessels. If a vessel 
penetrates the circular domain circumference, pilots are required to monitor the vessel 
movement continuously to assess collision risk. Using this concept, this will coincide with the 
transition from the Safe level to LR level in the proposed risk scale. The standards for DSM 
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and TSM at LR level would be the domain radius (DR) and the time to domain circumference 
(TDC) respectively. 
 
2.3 Risk perception survey 
 
To illustrate the method developed, perceptions of collision risks under different vessel 
interaction situations need to be obtained from the pilots. Perceived risk data can be collected 
by employing two experimental methods: simulation or survey. The former is an exercise 
which can be carried out using ship-handling simulators, where pilots are asked to navigate 
vessels in a specified navigational environment and to judge collision risks at various stages 
of the navigation. The difficulty in a simulation exercise is the amount of resources needed for 
a sufficiently large number of pilots to ensure a sound statistical analysis. On the other hand, 
the survey method involves conducting questionnaires among pilots by generating a suitable 
platform for them to judge collision risk. In this case, DCPA and TCPA values would be used 
to define the navigational conditions, and pilots would specify the level of their perceived risk 
under various conditions of DCPA and TCPA. The survey method allows a high amount of 
respondents to be obtained easily for a proper statistical analysis. The survey method is 
employed in this study. 
 
2.3.1 Survey design 
To collect perceived risk data, it is necessary to develop a two-way risk matrix, defined by 
different values of DCPA and TCPA. The appropriate values of DCPA and TCPA used in 
classifying the different navigational situation were determined based on the expert input of 
several experienced pilots in a preliminary survey. Based on the outcome of the preliminary 
survey, a 5x5 risk matrix is formulated, representing 5 threshold values of TCPA 
( )20,10,5,3,1∈  minutes and 5 values of DCPA ( )10,7,5,2,1∈  cables length1. Pilots are asked to 
indicate their level of perceived risk of collision in terms of Safe, Low Risk, Moderate Risk, 
High Risk and Very High Risk, for each of the 25 combinations of DCPA and TCPA. The 
perceived risk were assessed separately for the day and night conditions. 
 
2.3.2 Data collection 
A total of 160 pilots were given the survey forms. Participation was voluntary and the 
response is anonymous. A total of 70 respondents completed the survey giving a return rate of 
44%. The age of the respondents ranges from 28 to 61 years with a mean and standard 
deviation of 43.0 years and 9.8 years respectively. The experience of the respondents as 
harbor pilot exhibits a mean and standard deviation of 11.3 years and 10.9 years respectively, 
ranging from 3 months to 40 years. The wide range of age and experience in the sample gave 
quite a good representative picture of the population. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
 
3.1 Estimation results of the ordered probit model 
 
The ordered probit models were calibrated using the maximum likelihood method for each 
of the vessel class and separately for day and night conditions. Table 4 shows the estimated 
parameters and goodness-of fit statistics of all models. The likelihood ratio statistics of all 
models (e.g., 243.4 and 187.8 for VC1-Day and VC1-Night models respectively) are well 
above the critical value for significance at 1% level of significance, which implies that the 
                                                 
1 1 cable length = 0.1 nautical mile 
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models have reasonable good fit. The McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 values (e.g., 0.58 and 0.47 
for VC1-Day and VC1-Night models respectively) also indicate sufficient predictive power 
for all models. 
 
Both DCPA and TCPA show significant positive association with the latent variable in all 
models (e.g., for VC1-Day model: DCPAβ  = 0.27, p < 0.001; TCPAβ  = 0.12, p < 0.001). This 
indicates that collision risk decreases if DCPA and TCPA increase (see equation 3). 
 
The method for estimating collision risk from the regression estimates is illustrated for 
DCPA = 1 cable length and TCPA = 2 minutes, as shown in Table 5. A comparison of the 
risks with the scores of the risk levels (presented in Table 6) of all models shows that the risks 
fall in the HR range (e.g., for VC1-Day model: risk = 0.86 < RSHR = 0.91), which is expected 
for such small values of DCPA and TCPA. Risks in night conditions are also found to be 
higher than those in the day, e.g., the risk in night increases by 1.3% for VC1. The trends 
observed in perceptions of the pilots are discussed in the following section. 
 
(Insert TABLE 5 here) 
 
(Insert TABLE 6 here) 
 
3.2 Distance and time safety margins 
 
3.2.1 Safety margins at immediate evasive action level 
Ratios of safety margins to the maneuverability standards are employed to examine 
adequacy of the margins. Ratios greater than or equal to unity indicate that the margins are 
adequate. The higher the ratios are from unity, the higher the safety buffers beyond the 
standards. The computed ratios (presented in Table 7) show that the margins are adequate 
(i.e., greater than one) for all vessel classes in both day and night conditions. 
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
A comparison of the results with the ratios of DSM to ITA standard shows that pilots of 
VC1 hold highest ratios (3.6 and 5.4 in day and night respectively). It means that this pilot 
group maintains higher space buffer beyond the standard, compared to other pilots. For all 
pilots, the ratios in night conditions are found to be higher than those in the day. Among all, 
the highest increment in the ratios in night from those in the day (equals 1.8) is observed for 
the pilots of VC1. It means that these pilots maintain higher safety margins in night, thus are 
more careful than the other pilots in night conditions. 
 
Similar results are found in comparing the results with the ratios of TSM to TSE. Pilots of 
VC1 attribute highest ratios in both day and night navigation (16.4 and 26.3 respectively). 
Among all, this pilot group is found to be influenced mostly by a change from day to night 
condition, so that the ratio in night increases by 9.9. Interestingly, it is noted that the ratios of 
TSM to TSE are higher than those of DSM to ITA standard for all pilots. It indicates that 
pilots are keen to maintain higher safety margins in time than in space. 
 
3.2.2 Safety margins at ship domain level 
Ratios of DSM to DR and TSM to TDC (shown in Table 8) are also found greater than 
unity for all vessel classes, which imply that the margins are adequate. The findings at ship 
domain level are similar to those in the immediate evasive action level. 
 9 
 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
A comparison of results with the ratios of DSM to DR show that pilots of VC1 hold the 
highest ratios in both day and night conditions and the highest increment in ratios from day to 
night. This pilot group maintains DSM of 6.8 times the DR in day condition, whereas in night 
it increases to 7.9 times the DR. While all pilots maintain higher margins in night conditions, 
the highest increment in this (equals 1.1) is observed for the pilots of VC1. 
 
The ratios of TSM to TDC also show that the pilots of VC1 maintain the highest safety 
buffers (ratios of 30.9 and 38.2 in day and night conditions respectively) and are most 
sensitive to a change from day to night condition (the ratio in night increases by 7.3). The 
other pilots are also found to maintain higher margins in night conditions. 
 
3.2.3 Discussion on results 
Analyses of the safety margins have identified several findings. Firstly, the margins in 
night conditions are higher than those in the day. This finding is consistent with that in 
Debnath and Chin (2009) who reported that pilots perceive higher collision risks at night, i.e., 
higher margins are necessary to mitigate the risks. Maintaining higher margins at night is 
logical because during the day the speeds and distances between vessels and even any change 
of courses can be judged readily because of better visibility. At night pilots need to rely on 
navigational aids (e.g., radar, navigational lights etc.). This may imply that in assessing risks, 
pilots place a higher value on their own visual judgment than on instruments. Furthermore, 
effectiveness of navigational lights can be reduced in night due to bright background lights on 
shore and from nearby islands (see Akten, 2004; Liu, C. et al., 2006). Naturally visibility 
deteriorates at night which could further hinder the watchkeeping process leading to possible 
confusion in navigation.  
 
Secondly, there is a clear trend of perceiving higher time safety margins than the distance 
margins. This could be because the pilots are more able to perceive risk based on the visual 
image of a vessel and hence the distance between vessels. Since the pilots are less sensitive to 
time change when vessels are in relative motion, they will become more careful and hence 
provide a higher safety margin.  
 
Finally, pilots of low GT vessels (i.e., VC1) maintain higher safety buffers and are more 
sensitive to a change from day to night conditions than the pilots of larger vessels. The pilots 
of VC1 are generally less experienced with less knowledge of the port water characteristics 
and traffic environment. Lutzhoft and Nyce (2006) have argued that new pilots prepare a 
database in memory by combining static information from course books and navigational 
experiences, and use the database for future navigation. Therefore, these less experienced 
pilots remain in a learning stage and are more conservative in risk perception. Also such pilots 
may require more reaction time to decide and take evasive actions in a close encounter.  
 
4. Proposed framework of probabilistic risk assessment in CAS 
 
The foregoing shows that the proposed models have reasonable predictive power and that 
the perceived safety margins are adequate. This implies that the regression estimates can be 
used effectively to develop a CAS. A framework of risk assessment in CAS that utilizes the 
estimates to predict collision risk is now proposed. A block diagram showing configurations 
of the CAS is presented in Figure 2. 
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(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
The CAS requires the courses and speeds of own vessel and target vessels as input 
information and these can be obtained from on-board radar, global positioning system (GPS) 
and automatic identification system (AIS) of own vessel. By utilizing the input data, DCPA 
and TCPA are calculated to assess the risk of collision in vessel interactions. Interactions with 
non-negative TCPA values imply there is a risk of collision. For such interactions, it is 
necessary to predict and assess the risk and this is accomplished by employing the 
probabilistic model developed in this paper. Taking in consideration the vessel classes and 
navigation time (i.e., day or night), the model predicts the level of collision risk based on the 
values of DCPA and TCPA. From the level of risk present, the associated alarm to alert the 
pilots can be incorporated. 
 
By assessing the collision risk with all interacting vessels within the of detection range of 
the radar of own vessel, it is possible to rank the interacting vessels in descending order of 
collision risk and the associated level of alarm. With continuous tracking of other vessels, a 
real-time system with multi-level alarm alerts can be developed that will enable pilots to make 
appropriate corrective actions, prioritized according to the level of risk involved. This is 
particularly important when there are more than one nearby vessels that contribute to the 
existing risk in navigation. Pilots will be able to better manage the risk in a more systematic 
manner under such complex navigational environment.  
 
Even under less complex environment where interaction is only with one nearby vessel, 
the multi-tier system allows earlier warning with less serious evasive action compared to the 
two-state system. This should alert pilots who have temporarily lost situational awareness and 
help them to avoid entering unknowingly into a close encounter situation.  
 
Furthermore, the multi-level system will allow pilots with different experience and 
capability to better adapt their own judgment and courses of action to match the different 
levels of danger and alert produced by the system. This adaptation arising from the different 
perceived interpretation of danger and customized level of action is particularly important for 
the system to gain greater credibility.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
An ordered probit regression model was derived for probabilistic modeling of perceived 
collision risk in port water navigation. To illustrate the method, perceived risks were obtained 
from a risk perception survey on Singapore port pilots and are used to calibrate the models for 
different vessel classes under both day and night conditions. Estimation results show all the 
calibrated modules have reasonable goodness-of fit and predictive powers. 
 
Perceived distance and time safety margins were analyzed to examine their adequacy with 
standards of ship maneuverability and ship domain. Results indicate that the judgment of the 
pilots is reasonably reflective of the various safety margins. Several interesting findings were 
derived from the analyses. Firstly, pilots give a larger safety margins at night than in the day. 
Secondly, pilots tend to give a higher allowance of safety for time separation and this is 
largely because they judge time separation less precisely. Finally, pilots of low GT vessels, 
representing the less experienced ones, maintain higher safety buffers and are more careful 
than their more experienced counterparts in night conditions. 
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A framework to develop a collision avoidance system based on probabilistic risk 
assessment using the regression estimates to predict collision risk is proposed. It is possible to 
introduce an interaction component with multi-level alarm system to alerts pilots of the 
different levels of navigational risk. There are several important benefits of a multi-level 
system. It will help pilots to make an earlier evasive action. In more complex situations 
involving more than one interacting vessel, a more systematic and prioritized plan of action 
can be produced. Finally a more customized and adaptable system is possible based on the 
individual pilot experience and capability.  
 
While Singapore port pilots have been surveyed to develop the model in this paper, the 
modeling technique should be generally applicable. This research provides valuable insights 
into modeling perception of collision risk of pilots in navigation. The use of a probabilistic 
model to predict risks perceived by pilots is unique and robust. The developed models can be 
readily applied in developing a multi-level alert collision avoidance system.  
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Table 1 
Navigational collision risk scale 
 
Risk level Level of actions necessary to avoid collision 
Safe No actions necessary 
Low Keep safe navigational watch 
Moderate Take precautionary actions, communicate with other ship 
High Immediate actions needed 
Very high Collision imminent, cannot be avoided 
 
 
Table 2 
Vessel categories according to gross tonnage 
 
Vessel class Description 
VC 1 If 12000GT300 ≤≤  
VC 2 If 20000GT12000 ≤<  
VC 3 If 75000GT20000 ≤<  
VC 4 If 75000GT >  
 
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics of vessel lengths in meters 
 
Vessel class No of Observations Median Min Max 
VC1 383 81 26 164 
VC2 61 168 140 197 
VC3 137 209 164 305 
VC4 32 322.5 250 352 
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Table 4 
Ordered probit estimates for perceived collision risk 
 
 
  Ordered probit regression models 
VC 1 VC 2 VC 3 VC 4 
Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night 
Regression estimates of covariates 
  DCPA (cables length)        
 Coef. 0.2660 0.2179 0.5611 0.6502 0.2641 0.2710 0.2431 0.2088 
 Std. Err. 0.0221 0.0202 0.0487 0.0523 0.0248 0.0248 0.0123 0.0117 
  Z-stat 12.01* 10.77* 11.51* 12.44* 10.65* 10.93* 19.82* 17.85* 
  TCPA (minutes)        
 Coef. 0.1168 0.0902 0.3278 0.2637 0.1151 0.1181 0.1013 0.0892 
 Std. Err. 0.0108 0.0096 0.0288 0.0230 0.0119 0.0117 0.0058 0.0056 
  Z-stat 10.80* 9.35* 11.39* 11.48* 9.70* 10.07* 17.42* 16.02* 
Thresholds 
1τ  1τˆ  0.2716 0.3271 0.7505 1.3021 0.3212 0.5363 0.3732 0.4457 
  Std. Err. 0.1489 0.1402 0.2578 0.2364 0.1674 0.1659 0.0833 0.0808 
2τ  2τˆ  1.0468 1.2946 2.5342 3.3943 1.5432 1.8126 1.4135 1.5219 
  Std. Err. 0.1504 0.1486 0.2743 0.3088 0.1805 0.1857 0.0891 0.0898 
3τ  3τˆ  2.1088 1.9947 4.6098 5.9758 2.3581 2.7565 2.3464 2.4159 
  Std. Err. 0.1738 0.1627 0.4031 0.4776 0.2039 0.2147 0.1029 0.1027 
4τ  4τˆ  3.1519 3.0112 6.9348 8.5806 3.4408 3.9437 3.3680 3.2375 
  Std. Err. 0.2058 0.1912 0.5655 0.6476 0.2390 0.2602 0.1200 0.1154 
Summary statistics 
 # of Obs 325 325 225 225 250 250 950 950 
)0(LL  -500.5 -518.4 -334.0 -343.3 -395.0 -395.0 -1510.9 -1505.6 
)(βLL  -378.8 -424.5 -153.9 -150.7 -300.0 -294.4 -1193.9 -1242.7 
2G  (2 dof) 243.4 187.8 360.2 385.0 190.1 201.1 634.0 525.7 
 M&Z 2R  0.583 0.471 0.894 0.887 0.578 0.591 0.527 0.456 
* significant at 99% significance level; )0(LL : log-likelihood at zero; )(βLL : log-likelihood at convergence; 
2G : likelihood ratio statistics; M&Z 2R : McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2. 
 
 
Table 5 
Estimated risk level probabilities and collision risks (at DCPA = 1 cable length, TCPA = 2 
minutes) 
 
V
es
se
l 
cl
as
s 
Day Time  Night Time 
Predicted probability from model estimates Collision 
risk 
 Predicted probability from model estimates Collision 
risk VHR HR MR LR SAFE  VHR HR MR LR SAFE 
VC1 0.4099 0.2981 0.2383 0.0498 0.0040 0.858  0.4716 0.3433 0.1298 0.0507 0.0045 0.869 
VC2 0.3205 0.5857 0.0935 0.0003 0.0000 0.902  0.5495 0.4372 0.0133 0.0000 0.0000 0.928 
VC3 0.4313 0.4216 0.1159 0.0296 0.0016 0.887  0.5116 0.3925 0.0836 0.0120 0.0003 0.900 
VC4 0.4711 0.3623 0.1379 0.0269 0.0017 0.881  0.5233 0.3484 0.1070 0.0191 0.0022 0.901 
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Table 6 
Risk scores for risk levels 
 
Vessel 
class 
Day  Night 
RSHR RSMR RSLR  RSHR RSMR RSLR 
VC1 0.9138 0.6679 0.3309  0.8914 0.5701 0.3376 
VC2 0.8918 0.6346 0.3353  0.8483 0.6044 0.3036 
VC3 0.9066 0.5515 0.3147  0.8640 0.5404 0.3010 
VC4 0.8892 0.5803 0.3033  0.8623 0.5299 0.2538 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Safety margins and maneuverability standards at immediate action level 
 
Vessel class 
Ratio of DSM to ITA  Ratio of TSM to TSE 
Day Night Increase at night  Day Night Increase at night 
VC1 3.60 5.43 1.83  16.40 26.27 9.87 
VC2 1.99 2.30 0.31  6.82 11.35 4.53 
VC3 2.07 2.37 0.30  9.51 10.88 1.37 
VC4 1.34 1.67 0.34  6.41 7.84 1.43 
 
 
Table 8 
Safety margins and maneuverability standards at ship domain level 
 
Vessel class 
Ratio of DSM to DR  Ratio of TSM to TDC 
Day Night Increase at night  Day Night Increase at night 
VC1 6.77 7.90 1.12  30.86 38.18 7.33 
VC2 3.41 3.64 0.23  11.66 17.93 6.27 
VC3 2.89 3.22 0.34  13.25 14.79 1.54 
VC4 1.99 2.23 0.24  9.54 10.42 0.87 
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Figure 1 
Risk scores for subjective risk levels 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Block diagram of collision avoidance system 
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